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I develop a model in which cartel fi rms allocate costly effort to activities relat-
ed to productive effi ciency and concealment: the higher the fi ne or the prob-
ability of inspection, the more biased the fi rms' effort allocation towards con-
cealment. In this context, a fi ne increase can improve welfare through fewer 
cartels, but also reduce it through more ineffi cient surviving ones. The anal-
ysis suggests a carefully design of policy such that achieving a level of deter-
rence and productive (in)effi ciency socially accepted. Within this framework, 
I also consider the implications of leniency programs. I show that leniency 
enhances incentives on deviation more that in standard models of collusion.
Keywords: collusion, productive effi ciency, antitrust policy, deterrence, leniency
programs, social welfare.
JEL Code: D21, K21, K42, L41.
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En este artículo se desarrolla un modelo en el que las empresas de un cártel 
asignan esfuerzo costoso a actividades vinculadas a la efi ciencia productiva 
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y a actividades propias de la ocultación del delito de colusión. Particu-
larmente, mientras mayor es la multa por colusión o la probabilidad de 
inspección, más sesgada es la distribución de esfuerzo de las fi rmas hacia 
la ocultación del acto delictivo. En este contexto, un incremento de la multa 
a la vez que puede mejorar el bienestar social por su poder de disuasión 
del delito, también puede reducirlo a través de cárteles más inefi cientes. El 
análisis sugiere un diseño cuidadoso de la política de defensa de la compe-
tencia, que permita combinar un nivel de disuasión del delito con un nivel 
de inefi ciencia productiva socialmente aceptado. Finalmente, al considerar 
las implicancias de programas de clemencia demuestro una mayor efi cacia 
en la disuasión del delito con respecto a modelos estándares de colusión.
Palabras Clave: colusión, efi ciencia productiva, política de defensa de la com-
petencia, disuasión, programas de clemencia, bienestar social.
Código JEL: D21, K21, K42, L41.
I. Iඇඍඋඈൽඎർඍංඈඇ
To succeed cartels concentrate on two targets: profi t maximization 
and concealment. And to this end, member fi rms devote resources to pro-
ductive effi ciency and to conceal evidence. Costly resources face fi rms with 
the challenge to allocate them optimally, sacrifi cing productive effi ciency in 
favor of concealment, or vice versa. In this decision, the antitrust policy has a 
key role, as it affects expected detection  costs,  and through  it  the  relative 
importance  of  the  targets. In this context this  paper sheds light to the effect 
of fi nes and  inspections on cartel deterrence and on cartel fi rms’ decision to 
allocate effort among productive effi ciency and concealment.  This last issue 
takes special interest when fi nes are not high enough, as cartels might not 
only imply a welfare loss derived from less production and a higher price, 
but also an ineffi ciency loss derived from devoting costly effort to an unpro-
ductive activity as concealment.
In this paper I develop a model in which cartel fi rms devote effort to 
productive activities and to concealment: effort devoted to production reduces 
marginal costs and effort devoted to concealment reduces the probability of 
detection. Effort is costly and limited, thus fi rms have to decide on how to 
allocate it among productive effi ciency and concealment. The intuition goes 
as follows: cartel survival depends on the success of each of its member 
fi rms, not only as fi rms that play in a cartelized market, but also as fi rms that 
individually operate in complex (legal) markets.  Thus, within a cartel senior 
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executives have to be cautious on how to allocate their time, effort and attention 
among the own productive effi ciency and the cartel organization, in order to 
guarantee a balanced success on both.1 For simplicity purposes, among the 
activities related to the cartel organization, I focus on concealment activities. 
These include the attendance to secret meetings all over the world and the conduct 
of a joint sales agency, among other activities.2 For further simplifi cation, I 
reduce the three dimensions of care (effort, time and attention) to one: effort.
In this setup, cartel fi rms’ effort allocation depends on fi nes and in-
spections. When fi nes are low and/or the probability of inspection is low, 
fi rms fi nd it profi table to allocate all effort to productive effi ciency. However, 
as fi nes or inspections go up, fi rms substitute effort from productive effi cien-
cy to concealment. This reallocation of effort makes collusion sustainable 
in industries where it wouldn’t be otherwise and create ineffi ciencies not 
considered in standard models of collusion. In the light of these results, a 
fi ne increase can have two opposite effects on welfare, while it can improve 
welfare through fewer cartels, it can also reduce it through more ineffi cient 
surviving ones. Particularly, for intermediate fi ne levels, a fi ne increase implies 
a welfare gain from fewer cartels that does not compensate the welfare loss 
from more ineffi cient surviving ones. This analysis suggests a carefully design 
for the antitrust policy, as deterrence is not monotonic in the level of the fi ne. 
Indeed, a fi ne increase may enhance collusion sustainability and a welfare 
loss rather than deterrence if inspections are not set accordingly.
In the analysis I also consider the effectiveness of leniency programs. 
These programs reduce sanctions against the cartel fi rm that reports evidence 
of the cartel to the antitrust authority (AA) and cooperates with it along the 
prosecution phase.3 The effectiveness of these programs to improve deter-
rence lies in enhancing the temptation to deviate. In terms of my model, the 
prospect of an amnesty enhances deviation incentives more than in models 
1.Aware of how time and effort-consuming are cartel activities (not only concealment), cartel mem-
bers create complex hierarchical structures that set the role of each member in the cartel, as well 
as the rules to follow in case of eventual problems. In this way, the cartel is intended to be conduc-
ted as effi ciently as a legal organization. For evidence on the hierarchical operativeness of cartels, 
see Baker & Faulkner (1993), Griffi n (2000), Levenstein & Suslow (2006) and Harrington (2006).
2. Using data from 19  discovered  cartels,  Levenstein  &  Suslow  (2006)  show  that  cartels that 
used joint sales agencies were among the more successful cartels in terms of their long- lasting-
ness and fewer coordination problems. They fi nd evidence on the use of a joint sales agency 
to conceal cartel practices in the following cartels: bromine (1885-1895), cement (1922-1962), 
diamonds (1870s-1970s), ocean shipping (1870-1924), oil (1871-1874), potash (1877-1897), and 
European steel (1926-1939).
3. Spagnolo (2008) provides an extensive review of literature on leniency in collusion.
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without effort on concealment, as the fi rm that deviates saves effort costs as-
sociated to concealment (a deviant that applies for leniency has no incentives 
to devote costly effort to concealment).
The paper continues as follows. In Section 2, I provide a brief description 
of the related literature. In Section 3, I set up the model. In section 4, I solve 
it without effort on concealment (benchmark case), and in Section 5, I solve 
it with effort on concealment. In Section 6, I discuss the implications of a 
fi ne increase on deterrence and on fi rms’ productive effi ciency. In Section 7, I 
analyze the welfare implications of using leniency programs. Finally, Section 
8 concludes.
II. Rൾඅൺඍൾൽ  Lංඍൾඋൺඍඎඋൾ
This paper is closely related to studies on collusion that analyze pro-
ductive ineffi ciencies created by antitrust policies. Aubert, Kovacic & Rey 
(2006) show that whistle-blowing programs improve the deterrence effect of 
high fi nes, but that, however, may induce (i) cartel fi rms to bribe informed 
employees and hold their under-performance to avoid possible crime reports, 
and (ii) non-cartelized fi rms to deter good cooperation between them when this 
can not be distinguished from the type of communication involved in price-fi x-
ing agreements. Therefore, although these programs can improve deterrence, 
they can also reduce the productive effi ciency of surviving cartels and of non-
cartelized fi rms.
Within a principal-agent model, Aubert (2009) achieves this result for 
individual leniency programs. Under the assumption that competition requires 
less managerial effort than collusion, and this, in turn, less than deviation, a 
manager that privately chooses market conduct and productivity-enhancing 
effort may opt for an anti-competitive conduct to save costly effort. With the 
same logic, a manager that fi xes price is highly tempted to deviate from the 
price agreement. Thus, to avoid cartelization or, under collusion, to prevent de- 
viation, shareholders provide the manager with weak incentives to exert effort. 
In this context, individual leniency raises the costs of inducing collusion; but 
also makes it more likely the payment of informational rents and the request 
of ineffi cient effort levels when it is desired to induce competition. Therefore, 
while individual leniency contributes to deterrence, it also tempts competition- 
prone shareholders to induce collusion rather than competition. Regardless of 
the market conduct, productive effi ciency is not achieved.
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Similar to Aubert (2009), I also get into the fi rm’s ‘black-box’ to ana-
lyze how the antitrust policy distorts the decision problem of those who decide 
on the behavior of the fi rm. However, the mechanism in this paper is different 
to that in Aubert. While Aubert focuses the analysis on how the antitrust policy 
can distort the agency problem of a principal and its subordinate, I focus the 
analysis on how the antitrust policy can distort fi rms’ interest in productive 
effi ciency with respect to that in concealment.
A key element in my framework is the possibility of destroying ev-
idence of collusion.  Aubert et al.  (2006) suggest that fi rms keep evidence of 
the cartel if they fear that rivals will apply for leniency. Jellal & Souam (2004) 
point to fi rms’ interest in keeping evidence taking into consideration that con-
cealment is costly and negatively related to the inspector’s performance. The 
higher the cost of effort devoted to concealment or the lower the inspector’s 
effort devoted to discovering evidence, the more the evidence that fi rms prefer 
to keep. Following Jellal et al. (2004), I consider costly concealment as the 
driving force behind the keeping of evidence of the cartel. However, I assume 
that concealment can create productive ineffi ciencies by making use of effort 
previously devoted to production. This trade-off explains why fi rms keep car-
tel evidence in the absence of leniency programs or underperformance of the 
inspectors.
Other key element in my framework is the endogeneity of the prob-
ability of detection. Jellal et al. (2004) consider the probability of detection 
endogenous to the fi rms’ and the inspector’s efforts devoted to hide and 
discover collusion, respectively. Harrington (2004 and 2005) considers the 
probability of detection endogenous to current and previous periods’ prices, 
since he assumes that anomalous price movement make customers and the 
AA suspicious that a cartel is operating. Harrington & Chen (2005) extends 
these works to leniency programs. Similar to the probability of detection, the 
probability of paying penalties is endogenous to the cartel fi rms’ perception 
regarding the severity of the antitrust policy, Harrington & Chang (2009), 
and on the AA’s resources devoted to prosecute and convict discovered car-
tels, Harrington (2011).
This paper is in line with those that consider the probability of detection 
endogenous to the fi rm’s behavior, and not to that of the AA. The novelty of 
my work lies in the productive ineffi ciencies associated to concealment and, 
through this, to the antitrust policy. This is captured in the fact that fi rms’ will-
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ingness to sacrifi ce productive effi ciency in favor of concealment increases 
with the severity of the antitrust policy.
This paper is also related to the literature on the impact of leniency 
programs in antitrust enforcement. Two main results stand out in this litera-
ture. First, high amnesties, and particularly total amnesty, improve deterrence 
by making self-reporting attractive and, therefore, inducing cartel members 
to defect and report, Motta & Polo (2003), Aubert et al. (2006), Chen & Rey 
(2007), Harrington (2008), among others. Second, low and intermediate am-
nesties may have a perverse effect on deterrence:  when self-reporting becomes 
attractive, the threat of self-reporting to punish an agent that did not behave as 
agreed upon by the cartel may also become credible, and can be used by smart 
wrongdoers to enforce cartels that would not be sustainable in the absence 
of this threat, Spagnolo (2000), Buccirossi & Spagnolo (2001 and 2006). Re-
garding leniency, my paper has a very specifi c objective:  whether a generally 
accepted leniency program distorts cartel fi rms’ effort allocation, and if so, 
what implication does it have on fi rms’ productive effi ciency. To the best of my 
knowledge, this question has not been explored in the literature before.4
Finally, this paper also addresses the issue of antitrust policies with 
perverse effects, i.e., antitrust policies that contribute to cartel sustainability 
rather than to deterrence. Spagnolo (2000) and Buccirossi & Spagnolo (2001 
and 2006) emphasis the perverse effect of leniency programs in deterrence. 
Harrington (2004, 2005) shows how a fi ne increase can (negatively) affect 
profi ts from deviation more than the net value of future profi ts from collusion, 
facilitating collusion (i.e., relaxing the incentive compatibility constraint of the 
cartel). Similarly, I show perverse effects from an antitrust policy that distorts 
profi ts from deviation more than those from collusion, facilitating collusion.
III. Tඁൾ Mඈൽൾඅ
Consider an economy with a continuum of industries.  In each indus-
try, there are two fi rms producing perfect substitutes and there is an inelastic 
demand for two units with reservation price v I assume v  U [v, þ]. Firms 
maximize profi ts over an infi nite time horizon with constant discount parameter 
δ. To this end, they compete or collude on prices.
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4. For a generally accepted leniency program I consider a program that offers amnesty to the fi rst 
informant fi rm for its full collaboration in the detection of the cartel.
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To produce, fi rms have a fi xed marginal cost β, which can be privately 
reduced for the current period through effort devoted to productive effi ciency 
ai  0, i = 1, 2. I set fi rm’s marginal cost ci = β − ai.
The market demand goes to the lowest priced fi rm or, in case of a 
price tie, to the fi rm with the lowest production cost. Under a price tie and 
equal production costs, fi rms equally split demand.
Collusion requires communication, which constitutes hard evidence 
for cartel detection. Evidence lasts for one period and can be discovered by 
the AA during an inspection. However, fi rms can privately destroy some of 
evidence through costly effort and, consequently, reduce the likelihood of 
fi nding evidence in an inspection.
To model this, I set the probability of fi nding cartel evidence in an in- 
spection to fi rm i: e−zi , i = 1, 2, where zi   0 is fi rm i’s effort devoted to 
concealment. The higher is this effort, the lower is the probability of fi nding 
cartel evidence in an inspection to a fi rm.
 
Effort is costly. I set the fi rm’s effort disutility function as(ai+ zi)2 / 2. 
This specifi cation for the disutility of effort follows Holmstrom & Milgrom 
(1991) and is common in multitask analyses. It is consistent with the view 
that efforts are technological substitutes and that disutility depends on total 
effort (not on the fi rm’s effort allocation).5
To fi ght cartels, the AA has two instruments, fi nes and inspections. 
Both instruments are specifi c to fi rms, which implies: (i) in a single period, 
the AA can inspect either fi rm i, or fi rm j, or both fi rms, and (ii) under detec-
tion, each fi rm pays a fi ne F .
I assume that the probability of an inspection to a fi rm, denoted by 
ρ ∈[0, 1], is exogenously given. Hence, the cartel probability of detection is:
h (z1, z2  | ρ) = ρ (e−z1  + e−z2)− ρ2 e−z1 e−z2)
There is cartel detection if the AA fi nds evidence after inspecting one 
or both of the fi rms.
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5. For the effort allocation to be also relevant, one can introduce a weighting parameter μ ∈0+ such 
that [(ai+μzi)2]/2  . The assumption of  μ = 1 affects the degree of substitution between efforts, 
but in no case restricts the results of the paper.
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Note that each fi rm’s effort devoted to concealment creates a positive 
externality to rivals by reducing the cartel probability of detection. The lower 
is zi, the higher is the externality that fi rm i perceives from and additional 
unit of zj 
The timing of the game is as follows. At stage 0, fi rms choose whether 
to collude or compete. If one fi rm chooses to compete, competition takes 
place and the game ends. If, instead, there is an agreement on collusion, at 
stage 1, fi rms decide whether to follow the price agreement or to deviate. 
Under deviation, the deviant either slightly reduces price, or increases effort 
devoted to productive effi ciency, or both. In this way, it gets all demand.
At stage 2, effort, production and price decisions are executed  and  the 
rival’s price is observed. Also, inspections take place. At stage 3,  fi rms get 
their payoffs from sales. Under  cartel  detection,  fi rms  pay  a  fi ne  F  and  the 
game starts again from stage 0. If the cartel is not detected, but one fi rm has 
deviated, a punishment phase takes place. Finally, if none of  the  fi rms  have 
deviated and the cartel is not detected, the game repeats itself from stage 1.
In this setup, fi rms make simultaneous pricing and effort decisions in 
every period t. With an infi nite horizon, fi rm i, i = 1, 2, chooses prices pit ∈ 
[0, v] and efforts ai, zi ∈ [0, 1], in every t, t = 1, 2, ..., .6
Figure 1: Time-structure of the model
6. Latter in the model it is shown how effort zi  is particularly relevant under deviation: since under 
deviation the deviant produces more units than under collusion, it has incentives to substitute 
effort devoted to concealment for effort devoted to production. The fi rm that follows the cartel 
agreement, instead, faces no distortion on its effort decision rule. Hence, under deviation the 
probability of cartel detection can be higher than under collusion; this issue will be a key issue for 
cartel sustainability. This is explained in detail in next sections.
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Under collusion, price choices at date t depend on the history of pre-
vious sales, so that pit depends on Hit = ( qi1 ; qi2 ; . . . ; qi,t-1 ), i = 1, 2. 
The rational behind this rule goes as follows: under collusion fi rms charge the 
same price and split the demand in halves, qi = 1, i = 1, 2.7 Thus, for a fi rm, 
no sales implies that the rival deviated (in price, in effort or in both). Therefore, 
the strategy under collusion for fi rm i is to initially price at the agreed price pc 
(the price under collusion) in period 1 and to continue pricing according to:
as long no fi rm has deviated from this path. If a fi rm has deviated, there is 
a reversion to the single-period Nash equilibrium strategy of pricing, since 
Nash reversion can assure zero profi ts for the deviant.
In the one-shot game, fi rms choose price and effort devoted to pro-
ductive effi ciency to maximize current profi ts:
Proposition 1: There exists a one-shot game Nash equilibrium in which one 
fi rm obtains zero profi ts.
In the one-shot game there is a pure strategy equilibrium in weakly 
dominated strategies that yields zero profi ts for both fi rms. Also, there are 
undominated mixed-strategy equilibria that yield zero profi ts for one fi rm 
and positive profi ts for the other. Since at the static Nash equilibrium there is 
at least one fi rm that obtains zero profi ts, Nash reversion in which the deviant 
obtains zero profi ts constitutes an optimal penal code.
IV. Cඈඅඅඎඌංඈඇ ඐංඍඁඈඎඍ Eൿൿඈඋඍ ඈඇ Cඈඇർൾൺඅආൾඇඍ
Without effort on concealment, the probability of fi nding cartel evidence 
in an inspection to a fi rm is 1. Therefore, the cartel probability of detection is 
exogenously determined as a function of ρ: hB = 2ρ - ρ2.
The fi rm's problem is to chose price and effort to maximize:
Wඁൺඍ ංൿ Cൺඋඍൾඅ Fංඇൾඌ ൺඋൾ ඇඈඍ ඁං඀ඁ ൾඇඈඎ඀ඁ?...    
7. The decision rule of splitting the market in halves is standard in models of collusion with asymmetric 
fi rms and without transfers in the price agreement.
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The fi rst term is the fi rm's payoff from production and the second and 
third ones its costs associated to effort and to detection, respectively.
Taking partial derivative with respect to ai and solving: ai = qi, i = 1, 2.
Regarding price, under collusion fi rms charge the same price and split 
the demand in halves:                                          . Thus, in each period, 
fi rms make one unit of effort (             and obtain profi ts:
If a fi rm decides to deviate, it either slightly reduces its price, or in-
creases its effort devoted to productive effi ciency (to reduce marginal costs), 
or both. In this way, it gets all demand. A price reduction does not have side 
effects on fi rm's effi ciency, however the increase of effort on productive ef-
fi ciency does it. Thus, to maximize profi ts, a deviant always reduce its price 
slightly and chooses the effort level ad that maximizes the current value of 
profi ts from deviation. Assuming fi rm i deviates:8
Under deviation, the fi rm behaves as an effi cient monopolist: it devotes 
two units of effort to produce the two units of the good that the market 
demands. Profi ts from deviation are:
in the current period, and zero thereafter.
IV.1 Cartel's Sustainability
Collusion is sustainable as long as fi rms have no incentives to deviate, 
i.e., when the current gains from deviation (G) are no greater than the present 
value of net future profi ts from collusion.
(1)
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8. Since the optimal penal code yields zero profi ts for the deviant forever after deviation, the current 
value of total profi ts from deviation equates current profi ts from deviation:
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In this model:
For         , a price increase relaxes ICC, which implies that fi rms 
always charge the reservation price under collusion, pc = v.9 Prices lower 
than v make collusion harder to sustain, and prices higher than v would imply 
no sales. So, collusion is sustainable if and only if it is sustainable at price v. 
Along the paper I assume           .10
Solving for v in ICC:
Proposition 2: (Without effort on concealment) There exists v1 ∈ [v, þ] such 
that collusion is sustainable in all industries with high enough reservation 
price, v  v1. v1     is increasing in F and ρ.
From the AA's point of view, v1 states the efectiveness of the antitrust 
policy to deter cartels: an increase in the fi ne and/or in the likelihood of an in-
spection raises the threshold parameter v1, making collusion harder to sustain.
V. Cඈඅඅඎඌංඈඇ ඐංඍඁ Eൿൿඈඋඍ ඈඇ Cඈඇർൾൺඅආൾඇඍ
Allowing for effort on concealment, the fi rm's problem is to choose 
price and effort levels that maximize:
Taking partial derivative with respect to efforts, at the interior solu-
tion it holds:
ai + zi = qi
qi = Fρe-zi(1-ρe-zj)
Wඁൺඍ ංൿ Cൺඋඍൾඅ Fංඇൾඌ ൺඋൾ ඇඈඍ ඁං඀ඁ ൾඇඈඎ඀ඁ?...    
9. The partial derivative of G (LHS of equation (1)) with respect to pc is given by:  ∂G/∂pc = 1. 
On the other hand, the partial derivative of the present value of net future profi ts from collusion 
(RHS of equation (1)) with respect to pc is: δ/1-δ . For a price increase (Δpc > 0) to relaxes ICC 
it must be true that ∂G/∂pc=1    δ/(1-δ)  =  ∂[δ/(1-δ).Πc]/∂pc , which is true for δ  ≥ 1/2 . 
10. Otherwise, collusion is not profi table. δ  > 1/2 is the standard level of patient assumed in models 
of collusion.
(2)
(3)
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Equations (2) and (3) characterize fi rm's optimal behavior under both 
collusion and deviation. Equation (2) states that, for the same level of production, 
an increase in effort devoted to productive effi ciency must be compensated 
with an equal reduction in effort devoted to concealment. Equation (3) states 
that zi's marginal benefi ts to i's profi ts (LHS) must equate its marginal costs 
in terms of changes in the cartel probability of detection (RHS). The latter 
should be interpreted as follows: a reduction in zi implies additional benefi ts 
for fi rm i due to more effort devoted to productive activities (higher ai) equal 
to qi, however it also implies a reduction in benefi ts of Fρe-zi(1-ρe-zj) due to 
a higher cartel probability of detection. 
Rewriting (3):
Equation (4) is an effort reaction curve. It represents each fi rm's ef-
fort devoted to concealment in terms of the rival's effort devoted to conceal-
ment.11 Particularly, the higher is the rival's effort devoted to concealment, 
the higher is the own effort devoted to this activity too. To see this, assume 
that j increases its effort on concealment. Immediately, the cartel probability 
of detection decreases distorting i's equilibrium condition: now, i's marginal 
utility from effort devoted to concealment is lower than its marginal cost. 
Hence, to restore equilibrium, i increases its effort devoted to concealment.12
Regarding antitrust parameters: Ri(zj) is upward sloping in F and in 
ρ. The more severe is the antitrust policy, the more incentivized is the fi rm 
to conceal evidence, and thus the higher is the fi rm's effort devoted to this 
activity. Regarding fi rm's market share: Ri(zj) is downward sloping in qi. 
The higher is the level of production, the lower is the fi rms's willingness to 
devote effort to concealment, as higher market shares makes concealment 
relatively less important with respect to productive effi ciency.
Under collusion, fi rms charge the same price and split demand in halves.
Setting qci=1 in equations (2) and (4), reaction curves R1(z2) and R2(z1) 
Mൺඋටൺ C. Aඏඋൺආඈඏංർඁ
(4)
11. Using equation (2), one can rewrite equation (4) in terms of efforts devoted to productive effi ciency.
12. Analytically, for the same level of production (dqi = 0), an increase in zj (dzj > 0)
implies:
dqi = –Fρe-zi [( 1 – ρe-zj )dzi + ρ d(e–zj )]=0
where d(e–zj ) < 0. Solving for dzi:
qci =
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have a unique intersection point, that is on the 45 line. Therefore, there exists 
a unique interior solution:13
Lemma 1: Under collusion, aci+zc i = 1, and there exist F0 and F1, where F0 
< F1, such that: for F < F0 , all effort is allocated to productive effi ciency 
(aci =1) , and for F > F1, all effort is allocated to concealment (zc i=1).. For 
F ∈ (F0 ,F1), effort is allocated partially to each activity as determined by 
(5), thus aic , zic  ∈ (0,1)
For F < F0 , productive effi ciency is the relatively more important 
activity, thus fi rms allocate all effort to it. However, as fi nes go up, the 
relative importance of concealment increases, such that for F ∈ (F0; F1), 
fi rms fi nd it profi table to allocate effort among both productive effi ciency and 
concealment: the higher the fi ne and/or the probability of inspection, the more 
biased the fi rms' effort allocation towards concealment. Finally, for F > F1, 
concealment is the relatively more important activity, and thus fi rms allocate 
all effort to it. 
The critical fi ne value F0 is downward sloping in ρ: the higher is this 
probability, the higher is the relative importance of concealment with respect 
to productive effi ciency, and therefore the lower is the critical fi ne value at 
which fi rms fi nd it profi table to devote effort to concealment.14
If fi rm i decides to deviate, it slightly reduces price to get all demand 
(qi = 2), and redetermines effort allocation considering that its rival follows the 
price agreement (qj = 0).15 Setting qi = 2 in equations (2) and (4), Lemma 2 
follows immediately:
Wඁൺඍ ංൿ Cൺඋඍൾඅ Fංඇൾඌ ൺඋൾ ඇඈඍ ඁං඀ඁ ൾඇඈඎ඀ඁ?...    
13. To assure a solution in the set of rational numbers, I assume F > F = 4. This assumption is purely 
numerical and does not restrict the results of the paper.
14. Actually, both of the critical fi ne values, F0 and F1, are downward sloping in ρ:
15. As discussed in the benchmark case, fi rm i can deviate with a slight reduction in price, an increase 
in effort devoted to productive effi ciency, or both. In this way it gets all demand. However, while 
a price reduction does not alter i's productive effi ciency, an increase of effort on productive effi -
ciency does it. Thus, to maximize profi ts from deviation, the fi rm always reduces price. Whether it 
also increases effort devoted to productive effi ciency depends on the antitrust parameters ρ and F 
zci =1 − aci = − ln
F −√F 2 − 4F
2Fρ
(5)
c
i z
c
i =
c
i =1 ci )
F0
1
ρ(1−ρ) if ρ ≤ 12
4 if ρ> 1
2
F1 =
1
ρe−1 (1− ρe−1)
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Lemma 2: (Assume fi rm i deviates) Under deviation aid + zid =2, and there 
exist  F0d and F1d , where F0 < F0d < F1 <F1d  such that: for F0 < F0d, fi rm i 
allocates all effort to productive effi ciency (aid = 2), and  for F >F1d, to 
concealment (zid = 2). For F ∈ (F0d ; F1d ), it allocates effort partially to each 
activity as determined by Ri(zjc | qi = 2), thus aid ; zid ∈ (0, 2).
Critical fi ne values F0d and F1d are downward sloping in ρ.16
Notice that fi rms allocate effort under deviation similarly than under 
collusion: all effort is allocated to productive effi ciency when fi nes are low, 
but as fi nes go up it is reallocated from productive effi ciency to concealment.
However, the critical fi ne value at which the fi rm fi nds it profi table to 
devote effort to concealment is higher under deviation, F0 < F0d . In this the 
key issue is that under deviation there are produced more units of the good, 
and so that the opportunity cost of devoting effort to concealment is higher 
for a deviant. Indeed, for F ∈ (F0 ; F0d ) while the fi rm that follows the price 
agreement fi nds it profi table to devote effort to concealment, the deviant does 
not; this still prefers to devote effort to productive effi ciency. For the same 
logic, for F ∈ (F1 ; F1d ) the deviant fi nds it profi table to devote some effort 
to productive effi ciency, while the fi rm that follows the price agreement does 
not. Notice that for these fi ne values further reductions in the cartel probability 
of detection depend exclusively on the deviant. (Figure 2).
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Firm's effort allocation under collusion (ac, zc)  and under deviation (ad, zd) in terms of F, for ρ < 1/2. 
Effort devoted to productive effi ciency in dashed lines and effort devoted to concealment in solid lines.
Figure 2
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Two fi nal comments are in order. First, for ^                                                                                                   
efforts devoted to concealment under collusion and under deviation are 
equal, zid = zjc  = 1. Hence, the corresponding probabilities of cartel detection 
are equal as well, hd = hc. For F <   there is more effort devoted to 
concealment under collusion, and for F >   this is so under deviation. Thus:
Corollary 1: There exists  ∈ (F1 ; F1d ) such that: zid > zjc  if and only 
if F >  .  Hence, for F > , the cartel probability of detection following a 
deviation is lower as compared to when no deviation has taken place. Other-
wise, the opposite holds.
The second comment refers to fi rm's productive effi ciency under 
collusion and under deviation. Firm's relative productive effi ciency following 
a deviation is higher as compared to when no deviation has taken place. To 
see this, defi ne the ratio of effort devoted to productive effi ciency over effort 
devoted to concealment: rc = aic/zic, under collusion, and rd = aid/zid , 
under deviation. These ratios lie in ℝ0+ and are decreasing and convex in F. 
Then, the higher the fi ne, the more biased the fi rm's effort allocation towards 
concealment. But, they are not equal: rd ≥ rc, as under deviation more units 
of the good are produced and, thus, each unit of effort devoted to productive 
effi ciency is more valued then that under collusion. Thus, the deviant's relative 
productive effi ciency is higher than (or equal to) that of the fi rm that follows 
the price agreement. (Figure 3).
Figure 3
Firm's ratio of effort devoted to productive effi ciency over effort devoted to concealment, 
in terms of F. rc and rd denote ratios under collusion and deviation, respectively.
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G ≤ δ
1− δΠ
c
V.1 Cartel's Sustainability
Effort on concealment does not affect the previous result that states 
that collusion is sustainable if and only if it is sustainable at the reservation 
price, pc = v.17 However, it affects the result that an increase in F or ρ always 
improves deterrence. To see this, recall ICC:
For the benchmark case (without effort on concealment), an increase 
in F or ρ reduces fi rm's profi ts through higher expected detection costs. This 
profi t loss is independent of whether the fi rm follows the price agreement 
or deviates, as the cartel probability of detection is exogenous to the fi rm's 
effort allocation. Therefore, whereas a more severe antitrust policy reduces 
the RHS of ICC, it does not affect the LHS. As a direct consequence, the 
more severe the antitrust policy, the fewer the number of cartels.
Allowing for effort on concealment, an increase in F or ρ affects 
fi rm's profi ts in two ways: directly through higher expected detection costs, 
and indirectly through a distortion in the effort allocation. The magnitude of 
these two effects depends on whether the fi rm follows the price agreement 
or deviates (Lemmas 1 and 2). Thus in this context, both the profi ts from 
collusion and the gains from deviation depend on F and ρ. Whether a more 
severe antitrust policy improves deterrence depends on how it distorts the 
gains from deviation (in sign and magnitude) in comparison to how it distorts 
the expected profi ts from collusion.
In what follows, I analyze in detail the endogenous nature of the gains 
from deviation with respect to fi nes. On the basis of this analysis, the global 
implications of a fi ne increase on deterrence follow immediately.
Endogenous gains from deviation: assume fi rm i deviates. A fi ne in-
crease distorts i's gains from deviation as follows:
(6)
17. Since the price under collusion does not depend on fi rms' effort allocation, whether fi rms devote 
effort on concealment (and how much effort they devote to it) does not distort the previous result 
that a price increase relaxes ICC.
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Equivalently:
(7)
The direct effect shows the effect of a fi ne increase on G from different 
probabilities of cartel detection under collusion and deviation. For F < F0 , 
this effect is zero: when fi nes are low, all effort is devoted to productive 
effi ciency under both collusion and deviation; thus hc = hd = hB = 2ρ - ρ2. 
For F ∈ (F0 ;  ), this effect is negative because there is more effort devoted 
to concealment under collusion and, consequently, the cartel probability of 
detection is lower then, hc < hd. However this argument is reversed for F >, 
and the direct effect is positive, hc > hd.
The indirect effect shows the effect of a fi ne increase on G from differ-
ent reallocations of effort under collusion and under deviation. This is clearly 
stated in (6): following a fi ne increase, fi rms may fi nd it convenient to reallo-
cate effort from productive effi ciency to concealment; this effort reallocation 
depends on whether the fi rm follows the price agreement or deviates (Lemmas 
1 and 2).
Taking into account forthcoming discussions in this paper, I fi nd it 
more appropriate to analyze the indirect effect as stated in equation (7). The 
key element behind this formulation is that each fi rm determines its own, but 
not the rival's, effort allocation. This implies that, following a fi ne increase, 
each fi rm reallocates effort from productive effi ciency to concealment so as 
to equate the (own) profi t losses from a lower productive effi ciency to the 
(own) profi t gains from a lower probability of detection, given a rival that 
follows the price agreement. This effort reallocation has zero algebraical 
counterpart in profi ts (thus it is not seen in (7)). Yet, fi rms' profi ts alter, as 
the rival's reallocation of effort creates externalities. This is what (7) states.18 
(continued on next page)
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Note that under both collusion and deviation, the 'rival fi rm' follows the price 
agreement, thus the indirect effect highly depends on zjc  / F .
For F < F0 , the fi rm that follows the price agreement fi nds fi nes too low 
to worry about. Thus, the indirect effect is zero. For F >F1 the indirect effect is 
zero too, but for a different reason: for F >F1, fi nes are so high that the fi rm 
has already allocated all its effort to concealment. What if F ∈ (F0 , F1)? For 
intermediate fi ne values, a fi ne increase induces the fi rm to reallocate effort 
from productive effi ciency to concealment, (zjc  / F) > 0. As a whole, the 
indirect effect is negative, as h / zi is downward sloping in the total effort de-
voted to concealment, which is higher under collusion (hd / zid  ) > (hc / zic ).
Lemma 3:  With effort on concealment:
(i) for F < F0 , the gains from deviation are independent of F, and are equal 
to those for the benchmark case, and
(ii) for F > F0 , the gains from deviation are U-shaped in F, with a minimum 
at .
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18. (continued from last page) In the RHS, the fi rst term is zero, as in brackets there is the equi-
librium condition (3). The second term is the change in profi ts that the deviant obtains from a 
change in the rival's effort allocation. One can obtain the indirect effect associated to collusion 
analogously. In this way, the indirect effect can be written as:
which is what equation (7) states.
F
∂zcj
∂F
∂hc
∂zcj
− ∂h
d
∂zcj
( (
Figure 4
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One fi nal comment related to the negative slope of G with respect to 
F: for F ∈ (F0 ; F0d ), a fi ne increase induces both fi rms to reallocate effort 
under collusion, whereas it does so to only one fi rm under deviation (the 
one that follows the price agreement). Therefore, the negative effect of a 
fi ne increase on profi ts is less mitigated under deviation. In other words, a 
fi ne increase reduces more profi ts from deviation. This effect gets stronger 
as ρ increases, i.e., the higher the ρ, the higher the expected detection costs 
perceived by the deviant.
Corollary 2: For F ∈ (F0 ; F0d ), the higher the ρ, the higher the reduc-
tion in G that follows from a fi ne increase.
Solving for v in ICC, and given Lemma 3 and Corollary 2:
Proposition 3: (With effort on concealment) There exist v2 ∈ [; ],  ∈ [0; 1] and 
 ∈ (F0 ; ) , such that collusion is sustainable in all industries with v> v2, and:
(i) for ρ < , v2 is upward sloping in F, thus a fi ne increase improves deterrence.
(ii) for ρ >  , v2 inherits the U-shaped form of G with respect to F: for F ∉ (F0,), 
v2 is upward sloping in F, and a fi ne increase improves deterrence. Other-
wise, v2 is downward sloping in F, and a fi ne increase facilitates collusion.
While for low fi ne values (F < F0 ) a fi ne increase reduces the present 
value of net future profi ts from collusion, for high fi ne values (F > F0 ) the 
same policy also distorts the gains from deviation. As a result, there is a 
deterrence improvement following a fi ne increase for F > F0 , but not neces-
sarily for higher values of the fi ne. 
Figure 5
(ρ<)
(ρ>)
>
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Points (i) and (ii) in Proposition 3 state how in this latter case the 
policy effect on deterrence depends on the values of F and ρ. Briefl y, there 
are two possible scenarios: one for F ∈ (F0 ,   ) and another for F > . For F 
∈ (F0 ,) a fi ne increase reduces the present value of net future profi ts from 
collusion and also the gains from deviation. The magnitude of the latter effect 
depends on ρ, and so also does so the fi nal impact of the policy on deterrence. 
Particularly, for ρ >  the reduction in the gains from deviation is higher than 
that observed for the present value of net future profi ts from collusion; and 
hence collusion is facilitated. The opposite holds for ρ < , and a deterrence 
improvement follows a fi ne increase. Alternatively, suppose that F > : a fi ne 
increase reduces the present value of net future profi ts from collusion and 
increases the gains from deviation. Both effects work together to improve 
deterrence.
Let me stress the perverse effects that Proposition 3 states for inter-
mediate values of the fi ne: when the probability of inspection is high (ρ > ), 
the threshold price v2 inherits the U-shaped form of G with respect to F. In 
this case, the deviant is severely affected by a fi ne increase; so severely that 
collusion is facilitated.
Finally, it is important to mention that the threshold price v2 lies 
below that for the benchmark case, v2 ≤ v1. By a revealed preference argument, 
if it were not the case, fi rms would not have chosen to devote effort to con-
cealment in the fi rst place.
Corollary 3: For F=F0 , v2 = v1, and for F > F0 , v2 < v1.
VI. Sඈർංൺඅ Wൾඅൿൺඋൾ
In this economy demand is perfectly inelastic, thus welfare depends 
exclusively on whether production is effi cient. In other words, collusion cre-
ates an effi ciency loss if and only if the good is ineffi ciently produced as 
compared to when competition takes place. Under competition only one fi rm 
serves demand, devoting as much effort to productive effi ciency as output 
produced (the rival does not produce, neither devotes effort to production). 
Thus, production is effi cient if production is effi ciently allocated among 
fi rms (i.e., if only one fi rm serves demand)19 and if each fi rm is technologically 
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19. Considering total profi ts, the net contribution of total effort devoted to productive effi ciency is 
higher when only one fi rm serves demand. (continued on next page)
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19.(continued from last page) To see this, assume F < F0. For low values of the fi ne, total effort 
devoted to productive effi ciency is 2 under both competition and collusion, and there is no effort 
on concealment under collusion. However, while under competition only one fi rm serves demand, 
under collusion demand is split in halves. In this context, when fi rms compete the contribution of 
effort to social welfare is 4 (ai = qi = 2 and aj = qj = 0, i ≠ j ⇒ aiqi +ajqj  = 2×2 = 4). Under collusion, 
instead, the contribution of effort to social welfare is 2 (aic = qic = 1, i = 1; 2 ⇒ 2(aic qic ) = 2). Regar-
ding effort costs, under competition these are 2 (ai2 /2 + a2j  /2 = 4/2 + 0/2 = 2), and under collusion 
1  (2 (aic  )2 /2 = 2 ×1/2 = 1)
Consequently, the net contribution of total effort devoted to productive effi ciency under competi-
tion (2 = 4 – 2) is higher than that under deviation (1 = 2 – 1).
For higher values of the fi ne, there is less effort devoted to productive effi ciency under collusion, 
and thus the ineffi ciencies associated to production are higher then.
20. In the analysis I consider competitive profi ts from the one-shot Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies, which yields zero profi ts to each fi rm. Considering the equilibria in mixed-strategies would 
imply positive profi ts for one fi rm and, thus, industry profi ts higher than zero. For social welfare 
purposes, the distribution of profi ts between fi rms in an industry is irrelevant. For details on the 
one-shot Nash equilibria, please see the Appendix.
effi cient (i.e., if each fi rm devotes to productive effi ciency as much effort 
as output privately produced). Under collusion the former condition never 
holds, as both fi rms produce. Whether the latter one holds depends on the 
antitrust policy: when fi nes are low fi rms are technologically effi cient, but as 
fi nes go up their productive effi ciency goes down.
In this setup, a fi ne increase can have two welfare effects. On the one 
side, it can increase welfare through fewer cartels. But, on the other side, it 
can reduce welfare through more ineffi cient surviving ones.
Let W* and Wc denote the social welfare in an industry under compe-
tition and under collusion, respectively. Industries are uniformly distributed 
in [ ; ], thus total welfare in this economy is:
Within industries, social welfare is defi ned as the addition of the con-
sumer surplus (CS) and the producer surplus ( Π = Π1 + Π2). Under collu-
sion: Wc = Πc + R, as the consumer surplus is equal to the expected revenues 
from fi nes (CSc = R). Under competition: W * = CS* , as fi rms' profi ts are 
zero.20 Therefore:
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Taking partial derivative of W with respect to F:21
Inside brackets, the fi rst term denotes the welfare gains/losses derived 
from a change in the number of competitive industries. The sign of this term de-
pends on whether the fi ne increase improves deterrence or not (i.e., v2/F>0). 
Indeed, the term CS * (v2)–Πc (v2)–R is strictly positive, and shows the inef-
fi ciencies created from an ineffi cient allocation of production under collusion 
(i.e., ineffi ciencies from having two fi rms producing, instead of one). Thus, 
if there are fewer cartels following a fi ne increase there is a welfare gain. If, 
instead, there are more cartels following a fi ne increase there is a welfare loss.
The second term in brackets                                     represents the welfare 
losses derived from less effi cient cartels. Since higher fi nes can induce fi rms 
to reallocate effort from productive effi ciency to concealment this term is 
non-negative.
Note that for F ∉ (F0 ,F1), the second term in (8) is zero, as a fi ne in-
crease does not distort the effort allocation under collusion (Lemma 1). Thus, 
a fi ne increase improves total welfare if and only if it improves deterrence 
(i.e., iff the fi rst term in (8) is positive). This result is standard in models of 
collusion. However, for F ∈ (F0 ,F1), the second term in (8) is negative, as 
higher fi nes induce cartel fi rms to increase effort on concealment (Lemma 1). 
In this case, the fi nal effect of a fi ne increase on total welfare depends on the 
antitrust parameters F and ρ. This result is a novelty in models of collusion.
From this discussion and Proposition 3, Proposition 4 follows immediately:
Proposition 4: There exists  ∈ [0; ], such that,
(i) for ρ < , W is upward sloping in F, thus a fi ne increase improves total welfare.
(ii) for ρ > , W inherits the U-shaped form of v2 with respect to F: for F ∉ 
(F0 ,F1), W is upward sloping in F, and a fi ne increase improves total welfare. 
Otherwise, W is downward sloping in F, and a fi ne increase reduces total welfare.
Proposition 4 reinforces the perverse effects of intermediate fi ne 
levels: when fi nes are not high enough, a fi ne increase may be eventually 
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21. When taking the derivative, keep in mind that 
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detrimental for social welfare despite of its effectiveness to deter cartels. The 
latter case arises when the welfare gains from fewer cartels are not high enough 
to compensate society for the welfare losses associated to more ineffi cient 
surviving cartels. This result strongly favors setting very large fi nes such that 
no cartel survives.
Note that this result is in line with standard literature on collusion, which 
favors the use of very high fi nes to achieve deterrence22. However, this paper 
suggests something else: fi nes and inspections are not exchangeable instruments 
anymore. Indeed, increasing one of these instruments may have negative conse-
quences on the other instrument's impact on deterrence, fi rm's productive effi cien-
cy and, ultimately, social welfare. Thus, the general recommendation is that the 
antitrust policy should be carefully designed, pushing crime detection too much 
with a single instrument may be detrimental for deterrence and social welfare.
VII. Lൾඇංൾඇർඒ Pඋඈ඀උൺආඌ
Consider a leniency program that offers a fi ne amnesty to the fi rst 
cartel fi rm to come forward with hard evidence of the cartel. Leniency appli-
cations are public, hence any leniency application is observed by rivals and 
the cartel breaks. This implies that there are no leniency applications under 
collusion.23 However, this may not be so under deviation: for a deviant the 
introduction of a leniency program implies two strategies to choose from: 
(a) to deviate and to apply for leniency, and (b) to deviate without leniency 
application. On this decision, the fi rm compares its grains from deviation 
with a leniency application with those without it.
In the benchmark case, when there is no effort on concealment, the 
deviant makes the decision easily: it applies for leniency if and only if the 
fi ne payed after reporting is lower than the expected fi ne to be paid without 
it. If we denote with  θ ∈ [0; 1] the amnesty parameter (such that the reporter 
only pays θF if its leniency report ends in a sentence for collusion), the above 
decision rule implies that there is a leniency application if and only if θ is 
lower than the cartel probability of detection:  θ < B = ρ (2 – ρ).
However, when we introduce the possibility to devote effort on con-
cealment a deviant has an additional element to think about: how a leniency 
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22. Where it is argued that high fi nes achieve deterrence at a lower cost than many inspections.
23. Indeed, a leniency application is a betrayal to the price agreement and so leads to cartel break-
down immediately, regardless of whether the application fi nally ends in a sentence for collusion.
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application effects its incentives to conceal evidence. As a matter of fact, a 
deviant that applies for leniency has no incentives to devote effort on con-
cealment, as it will pay θF regardless of its effort allocation. Thus, assuming 
fi rm i deviates, alternative (a) implies maximum productive effi ciency and 
deviation with leniency application, which yields profi ts:24
And alternative (b) implies an effort allocation as stated in Lemma 2 
without leniency application. In this case, profi ts from deviation are:
There is a leniency application if Πil  > Πid  . Equivalently:25
Intuitively, if the deviant devotes effort to concealment, it is because 
such an effort allocation allows it to achieve the highest expected profi ts. 
Hence, to induce the deviant to collect cartel evidence and apply for leniency, 
the AA should offer a fi ne amnesty that more than compensates the fi rm's 
profi t losses associated to a different effort allocation.
Proposition 5 summarizes:
Proposition 5: There exist B,  ∈ (0; 1), where  < B, such that a leniency
program improves deterrence if and only if it sets an amnesty parameter:
(i) Without effort on concealment:  θ < B.
(ii) With effort on concealment:  θ < .
Two comments to conclude. First, deterrence is maximized at  θ = 0, 
regardless of whether we allow for effort on concealment. Thus, the anal-
ysis strongly favors full amnesties. Second, with effort on concealment, a 
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24. Applying for leniency, the problem of a deviant is:
25. With a little bit of algebra, one can easily prove that  is downward sloping in F and 
 ∈(ρ(e–2+ e–2 – ρe–3), ρ(2 –ρ)).
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Πli =2 (v − β)+ 2− θF
Πdi =2 (v − β)+2 adi − 2− Fh d
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successful leniency program implies a welfare gain beyond deterrence, as 
reporting implies full productive effi ciency for the fi rm that deviates. This 
'effi ciency' gain from leniency programs is a novelty in models of leniency 
in games of collusion.
VIII. Cඈඇർඅඎඌංඈඇ
In this paper I develop a model in which cartel fi rms devote effort to 
productive effi ciency and to concealment: the former reduces marginal costs 
from production and the latter reduces the probability of detection. Effort 
is costly and limited, thus fi rms have to decide on how to allocate it among 
productive effi ciency and concealment.
When fi nes are low, productive effi ciency is relatively more important 
than concealment, thus fi rms allocate all effort to productive effi ciency. But, 
as fi nes go up (or if inspections become more likely), the relative importance 
of concealment goes up, and fi rms fi nd it profi table to reallocate effort from 
productive effi ciency to concealment. In this context, a fi ne increase can have 
two opposite effects on welfare, while it can improve welfare through fewer 
cartels, it can also reduce it through more ineffi cient surviving ones.
Two results stand out. First, fi rm's possibility to reduce the likelihood 
of cartel detection makes collusion sustainable in industries where it wouldn't 
be otherwise. This result is intuitive: since concealment is costly if fi rms 
devote effort to it, it must be because this facilitates collusion.
The second result states perverse effects from the antitrust policy: 
a fi ne increase can reduce social welfare by inducing surviving cartels to 
be highly ineffi cient, or by facilitating collusion, or both. For the second 
effect, the trigger element is that the effort allocation under deviation is biased 
towards productive effi ciency as compared to that under collusion (as in the 
former case there are produced more units of the good). For low/intermediate fi ne 
values, this implies that the cartel probability of detection is higher under 
deviation. In this context, a fi ne increase may relatively affect the deviant so 
negatively that eventually it induces cartel sustainability rather than deviation.
On the basis of these results the analysis favors setting very high fi nes 
such that no cartel survives. However, in practice this is not always credible 
or possible to implement. In this context, the main message from the paper 
is that the antitrust policy has to be carefully designed, such that combining 
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both instruments, fi nes and inspections, conveniently: since deterrence is 
non-monotonic in the level of any of these instruments individually consid-
ered, pushing crime detection too much with a single instrument can lead to 
undesirable outcomes.
This result leads to a number of interesting observations, some of 
which may be lines for future work. For instance, what if fi nes are endogenous 
to some measure of the crime damage (e.g., to the price mark-up achieved 
under collusion)? This new element in the model may lead to imperfect col-
lusion, which would distort the relative importance of productive effi ciency 
with respect to concealment. In this context, it becomes crucial the analysis of 
the implications of endogenous fi nes on the non-monotonicity observed be-
tween deterrence and fi nes, fi rms' productive effi ciency, and welfare. Other 
interesting line for future work is related to the modelling assumption on in-
spections. In this model, inspections are fi rm specifi c, but what if inspections 
are industry specifi c? Industry-specifi c inspections implies that each fi rm can 
not reduce the probability of detection by itself. In this context, how does the 
critical fi ne value at which fi rms fi nd it convenient to substitute effort from 
production to concealment change? We should expect this critical value to be 
greater, as neither fi rm will devote effort to concealment without being sure 
that its rival has strong incentives to do so as well. These types of questions 
lead one to think about the importance of establishing the optimal detection 
policy under different frameworks; a clear challenge for future work on the 
subject.
Finally, in Section 7 I show that leniency programs can improve wel-
fare beyond a deterrence improvement. Since leniency programs demand full 
collaboration from the reporting fi rm, a leniency application implies no effort 
on concealment. Thus, by inducing reporting, leniency programs improve 
deterrence and assure full productive effi ciency from the deviant. This result 
is restricted to the case where deviation takes place, but, nevertheless, is nov-
el in the literature.
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IX. Aඉඉൾඇൽංඑ
 
Proposition 1: Equilibrium in pure strategies
Let's fi rst prove that there is no NE with ai = aj .
Assume pi < pj . Since i has the lowest price, it serves all demand. 
But, this implies that one of the fi rms is not optimizing. Indeed, fi rm i serving 
demand and both fi rms optimizing implies: ai = qi = 2 and aj = qj = 0, 
which contradicts the initial statement.
Assume pi = pj = p, then fi rms split demand in halves, qi = qj = 
1. Optimization implies ai = aj = 1, and profi ts Πi = p – (β – 1)– 1/2, 
i=1,2. Assume fi rm i slightly reduces its price: it gets all demand, qi = 2, and 
makes effort ai = 2. In this context, i's profi ts are Πi = [ pi–ɛ–(β – 2)]2 – 2, 
ɛ > 0, greater than before for low ɛ . As there is a profi table deviation to the 
candidate outcome, this can not be a NE.
Hence, if there exists an equilibrium, it must be at ai ≠ aj .
Let's prove that there is no NE with ai ≠ aj and pi ≠ pj.
Assume pi < pj , then fi rm i serves all demand, qi = 2 and qj = 0. 
The optimality condition implies ai = 2 and aj = 0. Notice that fi rm i can 
increase profi ts with a slight increase in its price. In fact, i's most profi table 
deviation is to charge pi = pj . But, then, fi rm j would fi nd it profi table to 
reduce its price below pi. This process repeats itself anytime pi ≠ pj . The 
outcome pi ≠ pj with ai ≠ aj is not stable and, therefore, can not be a NE.
Let's prove that there is no NE with ai ≠ aj and pi = pj ≠ p* = β – 1.
Assume pi = pj > p* = β – 1 and ai < aj , then fi rm i serves all 
demand, qi = 2 and qj = 0. The optimality condition implies ai = 2 and aj 
= 0. Since i's profi ts are positive for pi > p* = β – 1, nothing prevents j to 
reduce its price and get all demand. But this is a contradiction with the initial 
statement of equal prices.
Assume pi = pj < p* = β – 1 and ai > aj  . Firm i obtains negative 
profi ts for pi < p* = β – 1, so it won't charge a price below p* . But this 
contradicts the initial statement.
Wඁൺඍ ංൿ Cൺඋඍൾඅ Fංඇൾඌ ൺඋൾ ඇඈඍ ඁං඀ඁ ൾඇඈඎ඀ඁ?...    
Rൾඏංඌඍൺ ൽൾ Eർඈඇඈආටൺ ඒ Eඌඍൺൽටඌඍංർൺ | Vඈඅ. LI | N° 1 | (2013) | ඉඉ. 53 - 84 | ISSN 0034-8066
80 Mൺඋටൺ C. Aඏඋൺආඈඏංർඁ
Finally, let's prove that ai ≠ aj with pi = pj = p* = β – 1 is a NE.
Assume ai > aj , then fi rm i serves all demand and obtains profi ts 
Πi = (p* – β + 2)2– 2 = 0. Since j does not produce, neither makes effort, 
it obtains zero profi ts too. As both fi rms are maximizing profi ts: ai = qi = 2 
and aj = qj = 0 . If i reduces its price, it obtains negative profi ts. If, instead, 
i increases its price, j charges p* and serves all demand. In this case, we are 
back to the initial statement with one fi rm serving demand and both fi rms 
making zero profi ts. As there is no profi table deviation from the candidate 
outcome, this is a NE.
Mixed-strategy Equilibria
Each fi rm's payoff is given by:
Πi = (pi – ci)qi– a2
i /2 
Let i and i denote the infi mum and supremum, respectively, of the 
support of fi rm i's strategy.
Assume ai > aj , then ci < cj = c.
First, note that pi = pj ≥ c. This follows from the facts that pi ≥ ci, and 
that profi ts are strictly increasing in the fi rm's price whenever it is the lowest.
Then observe that fi rm i obtains zero profi ts if pi > pj . The same is 
true if i = j < i = j  =  and either no one plays  with positive probability 
or if some fi rm does (there is at most one), it is fi rm j. It follows that at least 
one fi rm earns zero profi ts in any mixed-strategy equilibrium. As ci < c, this 
is not fi rm i, which can always guarantee positive profi ts by pricing below c; 
so i < j  . Further more, i = c, since otherwise fi rm j could obtain positive 
profi ts by undercutting.
Consequently, if ai > aj , such that ci < cj = c, there exist mixed-strat-
egy equilibria in which fi rm i charges pi = c with probability 1 and fi rm j 
mixes price over the range [c, p’) for any p’ ∈ (c, v], according to some 
strategy Fj(p) = Pr (pj ≤ p) that satisfi es Fj(p) ≥  (p – c)/(p – β +ai), so 
as to deter fi rm i from raising its price. Given fi rm j's strategy, fi rm i's profi ts 
from deviating and charging a price  p > c =β  is [1 – Fj(p)] (p – β +ai) 
2 – a2
i /2 ≤(c – β +ai) 2 – a2i /2
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Given above strategies, fi rms' optimal effort levels are ai =  2 and aj 
=  0, being profi ts Πi = 2 and Πj = 0.
Note that while outputs and costs of the set of mixed-strategy equi-
libria are identical to those of the pure-strategy equilibrium, profi ts are not. 
Note further that while the pure-strategy equilibrium involves fi rm j playing 
a weakly dominated strategy, in any mixed-strategy equilibrium fi rm j plays 
an undominated strategy almost surely.
Now, assume ai = aj = a, then ci = cj = β – a, and min {pi , pj} =  β 
– a, since otherwise either fi rm could obtain positive profi ts by undercutting. 
It follows that there does not exist a mixed-strategy equilibrium in this case.
Proposition 2: In main text.
Lemma 1: Recalling equations (2) and (3), fi rm i's optimal behavior, i = 1,2 
is given by:
ai + zi = qi
qi = Fρe–zi (1–ρe–zj)
Under collusion, fi rms split the market in halves, qic  = qjc   = 1. Thus 
the former equation is: aic  + zic  = 1. This is the fi rst statement in Lemma 1.
For the second statement in Lemma 1 note that the latter equation can 
be reduced to:
for fi rm i, and:
for fi rm j.
The RHSs of equations (9) and (10) are equal, so that the LHSs are 
equal too, which implies: zic  = zjc   . Particularly:
Fρe−z
c
i =1 + Fρ 2e−z
c
i e−z
c
j
Fρe−z
c
j =1 + Fρ 2e−z
c
i e−z
c
j
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With a little bit of algebra, the reader can proof that zic  ∈ (0, 1) for 
F ∈ (F0, F1), where:
Remember that zic   ≥ 0 implies that F  ≥ 4; this restriction over the 
value of F affects the minimum value that F0 can take.
 Lemma 2: Assume i deviates: i has two units of effort to allocate among 
production and concealment (condition 2).
Setting qid  = 2 and zj = zjc  in equation (3): Fρe–zi= 2 + Fρ2e–zie–zj
c   
Solving for zi, there is a unique solution at:
With a little bit of algebra, the reader can proof that z id  ∈ (0,2), for 
F ∈ (F0d , F1d ), where: F0d = 4/[ρ(2–ρ)] and F1d = 4/[ρe–2(2–ρe–2)]
Lemma 3: Holds from considering Lemmas 1 and 2 and Corollary 1 in equa-
tion (7). See main text.
Proposition 3: By defi nition, v2 follows from setting pc = v in ICC and 
solving for v.
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The partial derivative of v2 with respect to F is positive; except when 
F ∈ (F0, );  < , and ρ >  , case in which v2 inherits the U-shaped form 
of G with respect to F (See Lemma 3).
 
Proposition 4: Holds from considering the results described in Lemma1 and 
Proposition 3 in equation (8). See main text.
 Proposition 5: In main text.
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